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The latest financial crisis was not only an unexpected, it was at the same time a very 
unpleasant event for a wide circle of people who have been affected directly or indi-
rectly (whose property melted rapidly almost overnight), but also a great challenge 
for all those working in the field for economic theory. This was particularly a chal-
lenge for those involved in financial economics. This field of economic science has 
been very popular and profitable in recent decades (and therefore very challenging) 
for young, capable and ambitious people. In addition to economists, this field at-
tracted many experts from the natural sciences, particularly mathematicians and phy-
sicists. There was, according to the global trend, an increase in the mathematization 
of economics in almost all of its fields, and a high degree of formalization of this 
theory. Things have, technically speaking, gone so far that this field of economics 
soon became understandable only to a small circle of specialists. This has had both 
academic and practical consequences. Complex mathematical models have created a 
feeling of ruthless scientificalness and certainty of the predictions ("mathematics 
doesn’t lie"), as well as intellectual prestige for those who handle them. On the other 
hand, such models were used as a base on which business decisions with long-term 
consequences were founded (there were truly high stakes in the game). Everything 
seemed to be perfect and was functioning smoothly and to the satisfaction of a large 
number of market participants (as measured by the amount of salary). And then sud-
denly a crisis erupted and everything collapsed like a sandcastle. Panic, disbelief and 
shock followed.  
With the outbreak of the crisis, in addition to many other difficult questions, a 
question arises whether the existing financial theory (one that is dominant in the aca-
demic world and on the basis of which a hierarchy in the scientific community has 
been built for decades) is at all relevant in order to understand the actual functioning 
of financial markets, and whether its predictions of events and processes in the (un-
certain) future, are something to be taken seriously and used as the basis for concrete 
business decisions? This is usually a much deeper issue and it also challenges the 
fundamentals of contemporary economics. Specifically, the crisis has raised the issue  
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of whether the dominant economic theory is a satisfactory explanation of how the 
real market works? In his book, which was published in English a few years ago, 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb
1, answers the aforementioned question negatively and suc-
cinctly states: the preeminent science (not only economic science) that attempts to 
"tame uncertainty" shows poor results. Why? It is blind for large deviations – the 
black swans.  
The Black Swan is an event which is rare (unpredictable) and unexpected. Or, 
according to Taleb, a black swan is a combination of low predictability (due to our 
fallacy on the likelihood of surprise) and strong influence. Seen from another angle, 
the black swan is something which is highly expected and which did not happen. 
Black swans can be explained, but always afterwards. Examples of black swans are: 
the Internet, World War I, a personal computer, the September 11
 attacks in the U.S. 
and the like. Taleb points out that all that surrounds us and what is important for 
people’s lives is subject to the dynamics of the black swan. The fact that people tend 
to behave like a black swan doesn’t exist adds extra difficulty to the whole thing.  
It is necessary, before moving on to greater presentation of the basic argumen-
tation that supports the thesis set forth, to point out that this is a book written by a 
great connoisseur. Nassim Taleb (a self-described empirical sceptic, antidogmatic 
and obsessive empiricist) is not a pompous amateur who wants to get attention with 
big words and shocking statements, but someone who is well versed in financial 
theory (he has a Ph.D. in the field of quantitative finance, specifically in the field of 
derivatives) and practice (he worked at the stock exchange for years). Let us also 
mention the fact that Taleb taught the application of the theory of probability in risk 
management. All in all, this is a man whose arguments should be taken seriously and 
carefully reviewed.  
Although this book reflects the original idea, or as the author himself says 
there are no recycled or re-packaged other people's thoughts, the list of references is 
very impressive. There are, among others, books on economic theory, behavioural 
economics, financial economics, philosophy and the philosophy of science, mathe-
matics, statistics, decision theories, psychology and experimental psychology. Such 
conceptual richness, e.g. the broad consultation of the results from many disciplines, 
is in line with his fundamental belief that scholarship without erudition can easily 




In the pages of this well conceived and skilfully rendered book, Taleb explains why 
we are not able to successfully predict future events. First, he elaborates the central 
ideas and the basic arguments in a form acceptable to a wide range of readers, and 
                                                        
1 It is hard to describe Nasim Nicholas Taleb (1960) in one sentence (polyglot, epistemologist, financial 
expert, essayist, university professor). He worked at the stock exchange and taught at prestigious univer-
sities (among other things, he taught the science of uncertainty). In addition to numerous scholarly ar-
ticles and essays, and the book Hedging: Managing Vanilla and Exotic Options (1997), in 2001, he pub-
lished the book Fooled by Randomness. Hidden Role of Chance in the Markets and Life which quickly 
became a bestseller and was translated into dozen languages (second edition was published in 2005). Last 
year he published his book The Bed of Procrustus: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms.     
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then actually raises it to a higher analytical level. It is necessary to emphasize, at the 
very beginning that Taleb does not question the knowledge as such, but points to a 
dangerous gap between what people actually know and what they think (or pretend) 
to know. Human thought suffers from "the illusion of understanding": everyone 
thinks they know what is happening in the world (which is much more complex than 
imagined); therefore a misconception that they are able to predict successfully arises. 
Black swan emerges precisely in the gap between what people actually know and 
what they think they know.  
In this context, the big problem is the so-called narrative fallacy. It is a strik-
ing weakness of human interpretation and tendency to favour compact stories rather 
than the raw truth (facts and figures). Among other things, the problem is the fact 
that we are not able to predict atypical events. All who claim that they are, according 
Taleb’s opinion are charlatans and that they are not to be trusted (the fact that even if 
they were awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics changes nothing). Taleb points out 
to the need of people for a fact they can cling on while trying to understand the 
events that surround them. This fact often has nothing to do with the processes that 
they seek to understand, but people still cling to it. They needed it as an anchor, e.g. 
support and landmark.  
The so-called retrospective distortion is in force: evaluating things only when 
they already occurred, and this causes different events to be shown in a distorted way 
(it is necessary to learn - which is not that simple - to distinguish between looking 
ahead and subsequent intelligence). When things are evaluated subsequently, that is, 
when they have already occurred, then the past makes seems much clearer (more 
settled and predictable) than it really was. Distorted interpretation and expectations 
based arising from it, which concern the processes that will unfold in the future are 
the source of future black swans.  
Taleb also points out the confirmation bias. People tend to seek only those ex-
amples that confirm their story and their vision of the world, and that denigrate or 
completely ignore by those which prove otherwise. There is also a striking asymme-
try in the perception of the outcome of complex events. The fact is that success is 
generally attributed to their own skills and abilities (which are always overesti-
mated), and failure to events that we have no influence on and to free us of any re-
sponsibility. All this results not only in distorted perceptions of the world but also in 
their perception of their own forecasting abilities. 
Since we are not able to face real uncertainty we transform into a form, which 
enables managing. We are forced to reduce the dimensions of the content in order to 
be able to absorb them. In addition, if the dimensions are larger, they are harder to 
define, and with the narrowing process, there is more order and less space is left to 
chance. Such a process leads to the misconception that the world is much better or-
ganized than it really is. The black swan slipped away from this simplification 
process.   
Taleb speaks about the ludic misconception as well. Namely, it is a fact that 
what is taught in colleges as uncertainty is far from the uncertainty that is encoun-
tered in real life: "The properties of uncertainty with which we encounter in real life 
they have almost nothing to do with sterilized uncertainty with which we encounter  
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in exams and games" (p. 195). The measurable (in terms of Frank H. Knight’s con-
cept) risk, doesn’t exist in real life, it's just a "laboratory fabrication." According to 
the Taleb this is nerdy uncertainty. In his opinion uncertainty should be treated only 
as a lack of knowledge, that is, directly opposed to knowledge. Therefore, one is 
wise, if he knows that he is unable to see things in the distance.  
Acceptance of any observations from the past as definitive and representative 
for the future is the key cause of our inability to understand the black swans. To illu-
strate, after the financial crisis analysts always thoroughly investigate the events that 
have occurred, arguing that it is good preparation for the new breakdown. In addi-
tion, it is overlooked that even the previous failure had no earlier precedent. So it is 
really just a response to clearly defined sources of uncertainty, but black swans re-




Taleb especially criticizes the famous Gaussian bell curve (normal distribution). It, 
completely groundless though, assures us that we are able to "tame the uncertainty." 
This is nothing but, according to the author, a great intellectual fraud. The key prob-
lem is that this curve ignores large deviations - black swans. As we go further away 
from the average, the odds of large deviations are exponentially decreasing. Atypical 
values are highly improbable, and therefore can be ignored. Such a conclusion, as 
Nicholas Taleb says, is a dangerous misconception when it comes to the real world. 
Measures of uncertainty that are based on the normal distribution neglect the possi-
bility and impact of discontinuity and great jumps. The problem arises when this dis-
tribution is applied to situations that are qualitatively different and where their use is 
inappropriate. The Gaussian curve is useful in those situations where we have va-
riables whose maximum values slightly deviates from the average. The Gaussian 
curve, the author concludes, "sucks coincidence" from real-life and turns it into 
something it is not. 
It is necessary to be more specific here. Taleb talks about two different 
worlds: Mediocristan and Extremistan. In the first world, when we have a sufficiently 
large sample at disposal, there is no individual case that will significantly change the 
whole or the total value. Therefore, extreme variations can be rejected. Specifically, a 
single occurrence does not affect the whole, and after certain observation, we can 
"find out what happens." In that world events are allocated (distributed) in accor-
dance to the normal distribution. In Mediocristan, the problem of black swans either 
does not exist or is insignificant. Taleb notes that those people who have undergone 
conventional statistical education, think they live in Mediocristan by default. Only in 
this world, as Taleb argues, concepts such as standard deviation, correlation, regres-
sion are meaningful.  
On the other hand, in Extremistan, extreme variations cannot be dismissed. In 
this system, the inequalities are such that the whole or the total value may be affected 
by a single measured value. The problem is that this impact may be disproportionate. 
Taleb illustrates this with an example. Take a thousand random people and analyze 
that set according to the net assets of members. Then add Bill Gates to the set. The 
situation will change drastically. His wealth will actually represent over 99 percent of  
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the group’s wealth, and other wealth will be at the level of rounding error. In Extre-
mistan, a typical representative doesn’t exist. The most typical are "dwarfs" or 
"giants". Unlike Mediocristan where winners receive only a small piece of the whole 
cake, in Extremistan, the rules of the game are such that the winner takes almost all. 
Extremistan is can produce black swans. In this world, we should be suspicious of 
the knowledge that is based on data. Specifically, in such circumstances it is difficult 
to predict the future on the basis of past data.  
By comparing processes in these two worlds, Taleb concludes: "In Mediocris-
tan, we are forced to suffer the tyranny of the collective, routine, obvious and antic-
ipated. In Extremistan we are subjected to the tyranny of single, random, unseen and 
unforeseen and" (pp. 76-77). That is where the black swans expect us. Of course, one 
should not hastily conclude that every event in Extremistan is necessarily a black 
swan. Predictable events which are scientifically arable exist in this world as well. 
Extremistan will not go away, so it will take some getting used to it and the best 
possible way to adjust to it.  
All social issues, explains Taleb, originate from Extremistan. Taleb believes 
that almost everything in society is the product of a few rare shocks and jumps. Atyp-
ical rather than "normal" events are often more important for their understanding. On 
the other hand, studies of social life generally focus on the "normal", using methods 
that are based on the normal distribution. Almost nothing relevant can be concluded 
from such a procedure. Taleb highly appreciates Popper's (Karl R. Popper) position 
on the functional and incurable unpredictability of the world. The inability to predict 
atypical events as a result has the inability to predict the flow of history. History and 
society are progressing in leaps and historians and forecasters like to believe in small 




Taleb speaks about epistemological arrogance and divides it into two categories: ar-
rogance in the presence of specific competence and arrogance with complete incom-
petence. Taleb accordingly, plays with notions of experts and expertise. Apparently, 
he believes that the terms of expertise and knowledge should not be used lightly or 
trusted unreservedly. Why? In some areas there are real experts, but there are areas in 
which self-proclaimed "experts" most often are not. The author states: "Our inability 
to predict areas susceptible to the Black swan, in conjunction with the general lack of 
awareness of this state of affairs, means that some professionals, who are considered 
experts, are actually not" (p. 19).  
According to his opinion (and he claims that he came to it through personal 
experience in contact with experts and "experts"), among those who are usually not 
experts (although they regard themselves as such) are economists, financial forecas-
ters, professors of finance, experts in political science , "risk experts", employees at 
the Bank for International Settlements, financial advisors. Next to them are the bro-
kers, clinical psychologists, judges, advisors, experts in human resources, intelli-
gence analysts. Among those who he regards as experts (the list is not complete) are 
the: cattle examiners, astronomers, test pilots, chess masters, physicists, mathemati-
cians (if they do not deal with empirical problems), accountants. People are, Taleb  
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adds, naturally inclined to listen to the experts, even in those areas where there are no 
experts.  
Special topic of this book is the implicit and explicit criticism of the domin-
ance of economic theory (especially its prediction), e.g. the theories that dominate 
the universities and the scientific community. Among other things it is based on the 
concept of balance and rational behavior. And rationality (maximizing behavior) and 
balance are closely linked with uncertainty (they imply its absence). In a world where 
uncertainty reins, both rationality and market equilibrium are losing ground. The 
economic science is, according to the author full of nerds - people who think too 
conventionally (and fundamentally wrong). He considers Samuelson (Paul A. Samu-
elson), Hicks (John R. Hicks), Arrow (Kenneth J. Arrow) and Debreu (Gerard De-
breu) to be the great sinners in economics. All of them were awarded with the Nobel 
Prize in economics. With their work and enormous prestige and influence they have 
taken the economic science of the right course. They gave it a false aura of scientifi-
calness (technical rigor), and at the expense of applicability. Namely, Taleb believes 
that they create a fictional world that they are able to fit into mathematics, but the 
problem is that these models are not applicable because of excessive abstraction. 
Therefore, Taleb suggests caution when it comes to academic economists and also 
adds: "If you hear from the mouth of any reputable economist words balance or nor-
mal distribution, do not engage in debate. Just ignore them or try to put a mouse 
down their neck" (p. 308).  
Taleb accuses economists (this word is often put in quotation marks) of Pla-
tonism: the situation when we think we understand more than we really do. It is when 
we take the understanding of what we know too serious and neglecting black swans. 
The particular problem in economy is that the forecast implies the prediction of how 
people will behave in the future. Neoclassicism (the dominant economic paradigm) 
assumes that they will behave rationally, which means they will behave predictable. 
In this concept, rationality is described as the maximizing behavior, which is reduced 
to optimization in different contexts. Taleb believes this procedure has no practical 
significance, but it serves only for the economists to compete for the position in the 
academic hierarchy. By studying economic papers (in order to test the ability of 
economists to predict) Teleb has concluded the following: "None of them provide 
convincing evidence for the claim that economists, as a community, have the ability 
to predict and that – even if they posses such skills all that such skills - their predic-
tions are, at best only slightly better than guessing, that is, they are not sufficiently 
reliable for making serious decisions" (p. 233). The economists are good at predict-
ing the usual, but fail in predicting the unusual. They keep missing the black swans.  
Particular subjects of criticism are the experts in financial markets. In this con-
text, Taleb singles out Markowitz (Harry Markowitz) and Sharp (William Sharp), 
who have founded their models on the "Gaussian foundatons". All models, including 
these, neglect or minimize those influences and events that are not included in the 
model. Although this theory did not contribute to the understanding of the real world, 
in a brief period of time it was widely accepted and developed. The aforementioned 
authors were awarded with the Nobel Prize for Economics. It seemed that uncertainty 
was successfully overcome, or at least brought under control. Experience has shown  
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the completely opposite: a company which was using their expertise went bankrupt. 
Taleb insists on the thesis that this was the case of intellectual fraud clothed in the 
mantle of complex mathematics that silenced all those who objected or expressed 
even the mildest doubt. These people were branded as ignorant and hopeless "in the 
circles of wise men". Taleb has observed the following: "By convincing themselves 
that this is a great science, they made fools of the entire financial establishment. One 
of the biggest losses in the history of stock trading, happened in a blink of an eye, 
without any warning" (p. 87).   
Taleb mentons only a few names of people he considers to be real economists: 
Bastiat (Frédéric Bastiat), Hayek (Friedrich von Hayek), Shackle (George L. S. 
Shackle), Minsky (Hyman Minsky), and Keynes (John M. Keynes). These are the 
authors who consistently emphasize the existence of fundamental uncertainty when 
economic events and processes in question. Among other things, Taleb reminds us of 
Bastiat’s book What is seen and what is not seem where the author points out the 
limitations of interventionist measures. He stressed that one should not only look at 
the positive effects of some measures ("what is seen"), but we should bear in mind all 
the other consequences ("what is not seen"). Politicians usually emphasize the posi-
tive effects (and they are usually related to a particular social group), a keep quiet 
about negative consequences which will affect the society as a whole. This is about 
keeping silent about consequences of the suppression of information that is invisible 
at first sight. Friedrich von Hayek has titled his address when he was awarded with 
the Nobel Prize in economics "The illusion of knowledge". In it he explained the ne-
cessity for economy, in all its ambition, to reduce down to a reasonable extent, that 
is, not to promise anything it is not able to realize. He was actually sending across a 
message instructing economists to forget their planning ambitions.  
Nassim Taleb believes that the strategy used by the researchers and entrepre-
neurs, is not the one described in the dominant economic theory. In a world where 
there are black swans, it is pointless to act as if they do not exist or to try to predict 
them. Maximum improvisation is needed and also the ability to recognize opportuni-
ties when they occur. In his opinion, free markets do not work by rewarding and en-
couraging skills. On the contrary, they work because they allow a person to try that is 




Does all of this lead to the conclusion that there is no need for prediction and that in 
fact every human action is meaningless and doomed to failure? No, says Taleb, you 
just need to approach things in a different way. For example, Taleb explains that we 
should keep away from the scalable and scalable professions. It is a profession where 
the rewards are not dependent on the amount of work. In these occupations there is a 
huge disparity between effort and reward. In occupations that are not scalable, you 
do not depend on the black swan (basically in the long- run you move above the av-
erage). On the other hand, scalable professions are good only if you are successful. 
They create extreme differences; few take almost everything, while others remain 
empty-handed. The scalable occupations have no average, there are only a few 
"giants" and a huge number of "dwarfs".   
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Taleb suggests avoiding major subjects, that is, all those things that can per-
manently jeopardize the future. Allow yourself, says Taleb, to be cheated in small 
things, but not in big things. It is necessary to learn how to rank the opinions and ac-
cording to the damage they can cause and not according to their credibility. Taleb 
also proposes the following: Learn to differentiate between positive and negative 
random events, don’t look for the accurate and local (in other words, do not be petty), 
seize every opportunity or anything that looks like an opportunity (this is something 
the entrepreneurs should particularly bear in mind); keep away from precise plans of 
the state.  
He, himself proposed a combination of hyper-conservativity and hyper-
aggression as a successful strategy against the black swan on the financial market. 
Part of the money (from 85 to 90 percent) should be invested in very secure financial 
instruments such as treasury bills. The rest should be invested in extremely specula-
tive stakes (there are some technical details of this procedure but this point they are 
irrelevant). So, instead of a moderate, the investor is exposed on one hand to no, and 
on the other to very high risk. The average will be medium risky but will be a posi-
tive exposure to the black swan.  
Taleb points out that there is nothing usual in the future. Those dealing with 
social sciences must constantly keep this fact on their mind. He says that despite the 
progress we have made and the increased amount of knowledge, the future will be 
more and more unpredictable. Chance is always something you do not know. There-
fore, referencing to coincidence means to reference to ignorance. Scientists should 
therefore not be ashamed or try to mask ignorance. The increasing complexity of the 
world to which man has contributed by his actions dramatically reduces the gains 
from modeling and forecasting. The importance of the black swan is becoming more 




The book The Black Swan drew the attention of scientists and the general public and 
provoked many reactions in a short period of time. Some accepted it wholeheartedly 
while others criticized it severely (few were indifferent about it). The fact that it has 
been translated into dozens of languages accounts for its planetary popularity. There 
are also some reviews which consider it one of the most influential books in social 
sciences since the Second World War. This is a brilliant book that upsets and pro-
vokes, and especially ruthlessly mocks false knowledge which together with intellec-
tual arrogance causes catastrophic consequences.  
Although it deals with an extremely complex subject, Nasim Taleb’s book is 
written amazingly simple and in a tone that greatly differs from the usual tone of 
academic debate (at times and with great humor). Taleb often combines rigorous 
analysis of the problems with interesting autobiographical elements, which gives 
special tone to the presentation and makes the text more interesting. As rightly 
pointed out by an analyst with regards to this book, it itself is an example of the black 
swan. 
This is a book all those working in the field of social sciences, especially those 
who make predictions should read. It will certainly leave them thinking. 